Debt, Greece, and the bumpy road toward a unified European economy

Caleb posted another article on this subject several days ago, but I thought I'd bring it up too as I took Professor Elman's European Institutions course last quarter and feel like adding some context.

Going back to that first day of class where we learned the Principals of Economics, a massive portion of the process of European integration is proof-positive that actors respond to incentives, especially economic ones. The EU and its predecessor institutions were built off two desires: mutual security and economic growth. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded shortly after the Second World War with these goals in mind. By bringing France and Germany together in an economic union, they had all the more impetus to lay aside their long-standing differences and stand together. Economic interaction without significant political interaction is quite possible, but political interaction without economic interaction is without a solid foundation.

The political integration process has always been driven predominately by economic self-interest. The European states have realized that it is often in the best interest of their economic futures to work together. This isn't universally true, of course: Great Britain, for example, continues to vehemently resist the adoption of the Euro or the opening of borders to their island. Short-sighted self interest is a significant roadblock on the path to integration, but so are the economic problems currently experienced by Greece, as well as the former Soviet Bloc countries. The founding members are feeling no small trepidation at being somewhat obligated to help these struggling economies with their relatively stronger ones. Like Britain with its mighty Pound sterling, they are reluctant to strain their own economies to aid the weaker member states.

Yet, despite the short-term incentives to ignore them, the long-term incentives (both economic and political) seem to have kept them to their word. Despite the difference in relative power and one-sidedness of their economic exchange, the strong European states seem set to weather the storm alongside their weaker brethren.

I'm not terribly sure where I'm going with this, discussion-wise, but the interplay between the political and economic arenas is interesting. What is needed to make actors look beyond the immediate costs and benefits of something to the long term? Why can the once volatile European states make sacrifices for long-term gains, while the competitive American financial corporations were all willfully blind to the dangers of their practices to the long-term detriment of all?